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Digest:  Schatz v. Allen Matkins Leck Gamble 
and Mallory LLP 
Kasey C. Phillips 
Opinion by Moreno, J., expressing the unanimous view of the 
court. 
Issue 
Does the Mandatory Fee Arbitration Act (“MFAA”)1 preclude 
the enforcement of a valid agreement to arbitrate under the 
California Arbitration Act (“CAA”)2? 
Facts 
In February 1999, Dr. Richard A. Schatz (“Schatz”) retained 
the law firm of Allen Matkins Leck Gamble & Mallory LLP 
(“Allen Matkins”) to represent him in a lawsuit regarding the 
assignment of income from a partnership.3  The retainer 
agreement contained a provision stating that the agreement 
applied to “any additional matters we handle on your behalf or at 
your direction.”4  The arbitration provision of the agreement 
provided that Schatz could “line out” the arbitration section if he 
did not agree to it.  However, Schatz did not line out the 
arbitration provision and thus agreed that “in the event of any 
dispute arising out of or relating to this agreement, our 
relationship, or the services performed (including but not limited 
to disputes regarding attorney’s fees or costs . . .), such dispute 
shall be resolved by submission to binding arbitration . . . .”5 
In February 2000, Allen Matkins represented Schatz in an 
easement dispute; no new retainer agreement was signed at that 
time.6  Schatz paid Allen Matkins $179,088.69 for their work in 
the easement case, but when he ceased payments shortly before 
the case went to trial, Allen Matkins demanded an additional 
 1 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE, §§ 6200–6206 (West 2009). 
 2 CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE §§ 1280–1294.2 (West 2008). 
 3 Schatz v. Allen Matkins Leck Gamble and Mallory LLP, 198 P.3d 1109, 1112 (Cal. 
2009). 
 4 Id. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. 
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$169,917.42 in a letter dated April 2003.7  Schatz failed to 
respond to the letter, and in January of 2004 Allen Matkins 
invoked the arbitration provision of the original retainer 
agreement.8  Schatz alleged that the arbitration provision did not 
apply because the retainer did not mention the easement 
litigation and the reference to “additional matters” was not 
sufficiently emphasized.9  Schatz also claimed that the 
arbitration provision was unenforceable under Alternative 
Systems v. Carey and that he was entitled to invoke MFAA and 
exercise his “statutory rights to nonbinding fee arbitration, and if 
he so elects, trial de novo before a jury.”10 
Allen Maktins disagreed with Schatz’s assessment of the 
arbitration provision but agreed to nonbinding arbitration under 
the MFAA.11  When the arbitrator ruled in favor of Allen 
Matkins, Schatz filed a complaint for “trial de novo, declaratory 
relief, and refund of attorney fees.”12  In reply, Allen Matkins 
filed a petition to compel binding arbitration under the original 
retainer agreement.13  Schatz opposed, arguing that Alternative 
Systems’ construction of the MFAA nullified the binding 
arbitration provision.14  Allen Matkins replied, asserting binding 
contractual arbitration would fulfill the MFAA’s de novo trial 
requirement because the California Supreme Court impliedly 
rejected the holding in Advantage Systems.15 
The trial court found for Schatz and the court of appeal 
affirmed.16  The California Supreme Court granted Allen 
Matkin’s petition for review.17 
Analysis 
The court began with a comparison of the MFAA and the 
CAA, recognizing them as “separate and distinct” schemes.18  
While the CAA applies to almost any civil dispute, the MFAA 
only covers disputes regarding legal fees and costs.19  
Additionally, the obligations to arbitrate under the MFAA are 
 7 Id. 
 8 Id. at 1112. 
 9 Id. at 1112–13. 
 10 Id. (citing Alternative Systems v. Carey, 67 Cal.App.4th 1034 (1998)) (italics 
added). 
 11 Id. 
 12 Id. (italics added). 
 13 Id. 
 14 Id. 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. at 1114. 
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statutory, thus, even in the absence of an agreement to arbitrate, 
a client may call for arbitration under the MFAA while under 
standard arbitration, both parties must agree to arbitrate.20  
Under the MFAA, an attorney cannot compel a client to arbitrate 
an agreement, but a client may compel an attorney to do so.21  
Arbitration awards granted under the MFAA are not binding and 
either party may seek trial de novo or the parties may agree that 
the arbitration is binding.22  The MFAA does not expressly 
reference the CAA, but it provides that an attorney must give 
written notice to a client “prior to or at the commencement of any 
other proceeding against the client under a contract between 
attorney and client which provides for an alternative to 
arbitration . . . for recovery of fees, costs, or both.”23  In Aguilar v. 
Lerner, the California Supreme Court inferred the clause “any 
other proceeding against the client under a contract between 
attorney and client” to include contractual arbitration under 
CAA.24  The MFAA states that if an attorney engages in any 
other proceedings and the client is entitled to arbitration under 
the MFAA, then the client may request a stay of the other 
proceeding.25  The MFAA also provides that parties may consent 
in writing to be bound by an arbitrator’s award at any time, but 
that in the absence of a written agreement to bind, both parties 
are entitled to a trial after arbitration is timely sought.26 
The court then delved into the decisions in Alternative 
Systems and Aguilar, explaining that they were “critical to 
understanding” the present case.27  In Alternative Systems, the 
client and lawyer had an arbitration agreement but the client 
invoked arbitration under the MFAA.28  After the MFAA 
arbitration, the client rejected the award and filed for trial de 
novo.29  Subsequently, the dispute was litigated by the American 
Arbitration Association over the objections of the client who 
challenged the arbitrator’s jurisdiction; the arbitrator found for 
the attorney and the client filed a motion to vacate the 
arbitrator’s award because “contractual arbitration was 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 24 Id. (citing Aguilar v. Lerner, 88 P.3d 24 (Cal. 2004)). 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. at 1115. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. (citing Alternative Systems v. Carey, 67 Cal.App.4th 1034 (1998)). 
 29 Id. 
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‘preempted by the MFAA with its right to trial de novo.”30  The 
trial court denied the motion but the court of appeal reversed.31 
The court of appeal in Alternative Systems emphasized that 
the 1996 amendments to the MFAA strengthened client 
protections so that stays applied to any proceedings initiated by 
an attorney to resolve a fee dispute.32  The court pointed out that 
the public policy behind the MFAA was to reduce disparity in 
bargaining power in attorney fee matters by providing the client 
the opportunity to elect arbitration of a fee dispute, unless that 
client has already agreed in writing to arbitrate all fee disputes.33  
The court also noted that the MFAA requires a written waiver of 
the right to trial de novo after the dispute arises.  Additionally, 
the court rejected the attorney’s contention that the American 
Arbitration Association (“AAA”) arbitration would act as “trial 
after arbitration” under the MFAA.34 
In Aguilar, the client sued the attorney waiving his right to 
MFAA arbitration.35  The attorney filed a motion to compel 
binding arbitration under CAA.36  The client opposed, claiming 
that under MFAA a client could not be compelled to arbitrate 
because arbitration was optional.37  The court found that the 
client had waived his rights to the MFAA arbitration and thus, 
waived any rights afforded him under the MFAA scheme.38  The 
court refused to determine whether the client was able to 
overcome the motion to compel had he not waived his MFAA 
rights.39  However, in a concurring opinion Justice Chin expressly 
addressed that issue.40 
First, Justice Chin reiterated the MFAA mandate that an 
attorney must inform the client of his or her rights under the 
MFAA before or contemporaneous to commencing “an action 
[or] . . . any other proceeding against the client under a contract 
between attorney and client which provides for an alternative to 
arbitration . . . .”41  He emphasized that the “italicized language” 
indicated parties may contract to use an alternative proceeding 
 30 Id. (italics added). 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. at 1116. 
 35 Id. (citing Aguilar v. Lerner, 88 P.3d 24 (Cal. 2004)). 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. (citing Aguilar, 88 P.3d 24 (Cal. 2004) (Chin, J., concurring)). 
 41 Id. (emphasis in original). 
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to resolve their dispute rather than resorting to judicial action.42  
Justice Chin went on to state that if a client invoked MFAA, the 
Act would provide a stay of other proceedings until the MFAA 
arbitration was completed; but only until the MFAA arbitration 
was completed.43  While Justice Chin acknowledged that the 
statutory language of the MFAA lacked clarity, he expressly 
rejected the Alternative Systems court’s inference that “the 
client’s right to trial de novo trumps contractual obligations 
under binding arbitration” stating that such an inference would 
render meaningless the MFAA acknowledgement that parties 
could consent to a form of dispute resolution other than judicial 
action.44  Justice Chin rejected Alternative Systems as illogical 
because it provided the client with the means of escaping an 
agreement to submit disputes to binding arbitration by simply 
asking for nonbinding arbitration.45  The court of appeal in the 
instant case dismissed Justice Chin’s analysis, instead choosing 
to follow the decision in Alternative Systems, and found that 
clients have the “right to trial de novo after nonbinding 
arbitration under the MFAA even when they have signed 
prospective waivers of trial after arbitration[;]” thus, “the MFAA 
trumps the CAA” in those situations.46 
The court then looked directly to the statutory language of 
the MFAA.47  The court found that the MFAA, when invoked, 
provided automatic stays for actions or other proceedings, 
including binding arbitration, but that such proceedings would 
move forward once MFAA arbitration was completed.48  The 
court then rejected Schatz’s argument that the MFAA disallows 
binding arbitration, stating that the MFAA “does not foreclose 
the possibility that, under a general agreement between the 
parties, the nonbinding MFAA process should be followed by 
binding arbitration, rather than by lawsuit.”49  The court also 
recognized that the MFAA provides for a trail following the 
MFAA arbitration, but does not confer “immunity from valid 
defenses, such as the existence of a contractual obligation to 
arbitrate.”50 
Finally, the court considered whether the MFAA impliedly 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. at 1116–17 (italics added). 
 45 Id. at 1117. 
 46 Id. (citing Schatz v. Allen Matkins Leck Gamble and Mallory LLP, 146 
Cal.App.4th 674 (2007)) (italics added). 
 47 Id. at 1118. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. at 1119 (emphasis in original). 
 50 Id. 
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repealed the CAA.51  The court first established that “[a]ll 
presumptions are against a repeal by implication” and that an 
implied repeal is only found where statutes conflict such that no 
harmony can be achieved.52  The court found that the MFAA 
could not possibly repeal the CAA because the two acts do not 
govern the same subject matter—the MFAA covers “nonbinding 
arbitration that the parties did not agree to in advance” and the 
CAA covers “binding arbitration agreed to in advance.”53  The 
court also acknowledged that the statutes may be reconciled 
because each creates a different type of arbitration, both of which 
may be given effect.54  The MFAA creates a nonbinding 
arbitration; if the arbitration is unsuccessful, the MFAA has 
fulfilled its role and the parties may pursue other proceedings 
including judicial action or binding arbitration, to resolve the 
dispute.  In the event the parties selected binding arbitration, or 
contracted to such in advance, the CAA would apply.55  The court 
identified two anomalies that would be created by interpreting 
the MFAA to repeal the CAA: (1) clients would be able to evade 
their agreements to arbitrate by requesting and completing 
MFAA nonbinding arbitration, thus making a charade out of 
MFAA arbitration just to get to trial, and (2) attorneys could 
evade their agreements to arbitrate if their clients requested 
arbitration under the MFAA, thus a client might not choose to 
invoke their MFAA rights because of the chance that the 
nonbinding arbitration might fail, and the attorney would 
proceed to trial instead of the agreed upon binding arbitration.56 
Holding 
The court held that “the MFAA does not stand as an obstacle 
to the enforcement of a valid agreement to arbitrate pursuant to 
the CAA.”57 
Legal Significance 
The decision establishes that the MFAA and CAA are 
designed to work together.  The MFAA protects, in the form of 
nonbinding arbitration with the potential for trial de novo, clients 
who find themselves engaged in fee disputes with their attorney.  
Meanwhile, the CAA protects the arbitration agreements entered 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. at 1120. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. at 1120–21. 
 57 Id. at 1121. 
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into by both client and attorney.  When the MFAA has fulfilled 
its role, the CAA takes over. 
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